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Abstract—Scan based attacks are the major security concerns
of a design. These attacks are majorly employed to understand
the camouflaged logic during reverse engineering. The state-
of-the-art techniques like scan chain scrambling hinder acces-
sibility of scan chains, but are prone to layout level reverse
engineering attacks. In the proposed methodology, the scan
design is secured by adding an extra scan input port (DSI)
to the flipflop using dummy contacts, which ensure that DSI
cannot be distinguished from SI port even with layout based
reverse engineering techniques. Dummy scan chain connections
are introduced in the design by connecting DSI port to the nearby
flipflop Q output port. Our proposed method can withstand
Reset-and-scan attack, Incremental SAT-based attack and the
recent ScanSAT attack. The performance of this concept is
measured in terms of frequency and total power consumption on
IWLS-2005 benchmark circuits having up to 1380 flipflops with
40nm technology library. The delay is effected by a maximum
of 2.2% with 50% obfuscation without any impact on power,
pattern generation time and scan test time.
Index Terms—Scan Chain, Hardware Security, Camouflage,
Obfuscation, Dummy Contacts, SAT
I. INTRODUCTION
TEST and security are the most critical requirements fora trusted IC design. Scan test structures are generally
inserted in the design with an intent to increase testability [1]
which are exploited in scan based attacks to break security. The
motto of the attack is either to break the security of symmetric-
key or public-key cryptography [2]- [4] or to decode the cam-
ouflaged combinational logic [5]. In this paper, we focus on the
scan based attacks to decode the camouflaged combinational
logic. Camouflaging, a layout based technique where different
logic functions can be implemented by look-alike cells [6]
or obfusgates [7], is widely used to enhance security of a
design. In SAT-based attack, [8], camouflaged standard cells
[6], obfusgates [7] or the transformable interconnects [9] are
represented as a multiplexer based model having all required
combinations. The functionality of the circuit is determined
by finding the select lines of multiplexer by controlling and
observing its ports with the help of scan chains. To overcome
SAT attack, inter flipflop connections can be obfuscated by
using RNG based scrambling techniques [10]. But, the RNG
can be bypassed or removed and fixed pattern can be inserted
when an incorrect sequence is used. Locking muxes are
inserted in the recently proposed key based Encrypt Flipflop
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method [11]. However, as reported in [11], this method is
vulnerable to Reset-and-scan attack. ScanSAT attack [12],
transforms scan obfuscated circuit into its logic locked version
and applies a variant of SAT based attack [8] to extract the
secret key by controlling/observing the scan-in/scan-out pin.
The scan chain connections obtained may not exactly match
the actual scan connections. A technique to reverse engineer
without the use of scan chains [13], is effective only if the
ratio of the primary IOs to the Scan flipflops is reasonably
large which is not applicable for realistic circuits.While [13]
takes on a goal of attacking with no scan access, such attacks
need further development to be successful on realistic designs.
In view of above, we introduce a novel methodology to
secure the design from the state of the art scan based attacks.
The key contributions of the paper are
• The proposed methodology secures the design from the
state of the art techniques like Incremental SAT, ScanSAT
and Layout level Reverse Engineering attacks.
• The proposed methodology has least impact on the design
in terms of performance that includes delay, power and
pattern generation time.
II. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In the proposed countermeasure, scan camouflaging flipflops
are created by adding a second scan input pin to the scan
flipflop. One of the scan inputs is connected with actual contact
and is referred to as SI. Another scan input is connected
with dummy(no) contact and is referred to as DSI. Hence,
although two scan inputs are present, only one of them is
internally routed and connected to flipflop output. Figure 1
shows the layout of scan camouflaging flipflop. Two different
versions of scan camouflaging flipflops have to be created
by interchanging the locations of SI and DSI. After scan
stitching, selected scan flipflops are converted into one of
these two versions of scan camouflaging flipflops. Extra scan
connections are made by connecting the DSI of these flipflops
to the outputs of nearby flipflops. Consider Figure 2 where ten
flipflops are stitched into two scan chains with five flipflops in
each chain. Chain1 consists of flipflops A, B, C, D and E and
chain2 consists of flipflops F, G, H, I and J. Flipflops B, C,
D, E, G, H, I and J are converted into scan camouflaging
flipflops. Instead of adding a new port DSI, for ease of
representation, the dummy scan connections on these flipflops
B, C, D, E, G, H, I and J are shown in blue dotted lines. To
differentiate between the actual scan connections and dummy
Fig. 1. Layout of Proposed scan camouflaging flipflop
Fig. 2. Protection using Proposed methodology
scan connections, the attacker has to differentiate between SI
and DSI of the scan camouflaging flipflops. For ascertaining
this, the attacker has to partially etch the metal layers from top-
down using anisotropic techniques like reactive-ion etching.
While applying these techniques, by the time the attacker
comes to the bottom layers, the dummy contacts are almost
eroded by the chemicals. Attacker cannot distinguish if a
broken contact is because of chemical erosion or camouflaging
[14] - [15]. Hence, proposed technique makes it difficult to
delayer the device and decode the scan architecture even
with image processing based reverse engineering techniques.
The cost and effort that is required to decode the scan
architecture outweighs the advantage of reverse engineering.
IWLS-2005 benchmark circuits are implemented using these
flipflops. Results are analyzed for understanding the impact
on delay, power, pattern generation time and scan test time.
To further increase the complexity, by including the proposed
methodology in the form of an automated Computer Aided
Design tool, the scan camouflaging flipflops configuration
can be made different for different devices. In such a case,
although the attacker does reverse engineering and understand
the logic of one device, the scan camouflaging flipflops of
other devices cannot be ascertained. But, having different
layout for each device is not a feasible solution. Hence, there
can be few different versions of the device and they all can
be manufactured on the same wafer.
TABLE I
POSSIBILITIES WITH 2 SCAN CHAINS HAVING 4 SCAN CAMOUFLAGING
FLIPFLOPS IN EACH CHAIN
Possibility Chain1 Chain2
1 SI1-A-B-C-D-E-SO1 SI2-F-G-H-I-J-SO2
2 SI1-A-G-C-D-E-SO1 SI2-F-B-H-I-J-SO2
3 SI1-A-B-H-D-E-SO1 SI2-F-G-C-I-J-SO2
4 SI1-A-G-H-D-E-SO1 SI2-F-B-C-I-J-SO2
5 SI1-A-B-C-I-E-SO1 SI2-F-G-H-D-J-SO2
6 SI1-A-G-C-D-E-SO1 SI2-F-B-H-I-J-SO2
7 SI1-A-B-H-I-E-SO1 SI2-F-G-C-D-J-SO2
8 SI1-A-G-H-I-E-SO1 SI2-F-B-C-D-J-SO2
A. Investigating the effect of Incremental SAT-based attack on
the design having scan camouflaging flipflops
Incremental SAT-based attack requires the understanding of
scan architecture and its full controllability and observability.
Attacker understands the scan architecture from the images
that are obtained during reverse engineering [16]. Our pro-
posed methodology adds confusion because of dummy scan
input ports. Although layout information can be obtained from
images, the actual scan architecture cannot be ascertained as
there would be confusion on which port is dummy scan input.
Consider the scan camouflaging flipflop network as shown
in Figure 2. The scan camouflaging connections are named as
k0, k1, k2 and k3. In this circuit, with two scan chains and
four scan camouflaging flipflops per chain, the total number
of possibilities to create confusion is eight as depicted in
Table I. Unless the attacker finds out which of the camou-
flaging connections, k0, k1, k2 and k3 are valid, he/she will
not be able to find out which signal is getting connected
to the combinational logic input and to what scan out the
combinational logic output is connected. Similarly, for 4 scan
chains and 4 scan camouflaging flipflops per chain, the total
number of possibilities to create confusion is sixteen. As there
is confusion both in controlling and observing the camouflaged
combinational circuit, even two camouflaging flipflop combi-
nations that create confusion (one for controllability and the
other for observability) would make it difficult to apply SAT-
based attack. Hence, the camouflaged combinational circuit
cannot be decoded using incremental SAT-based attack in the
presence of scan camouflaging flipflops.
B. Investigating the effect of ScanSAT attack on the design
having scan camouflaging flipflops
ScanSAT [12] helps transforming any obfuscated sequential
logic into logic locked problem with keys. The logic locked
problem can be resolved using SAT-based attack [8]. The
relation between scan In1 (a4 − a0) and the pattern delivered
into the scan chain1 (a′4 − a′0) can be formulated as
a′0 = a0 (1)
a′1 = a1k0 + c1k0 (2)
a′2 = a2(k0 ⊕ k1) + c2(k0 ⊕ k1) (3)
a′3 = a3(k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2) + c3(k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2) (4)
a′4 = a4(k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3) + c4(k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3) (5)
Similarly, for scan chain2 (c′4 − c′0) can be represented in
terms of (c4−c0) by replacing c and a with a and c respectively
in the equations (1) - (5)
The relation between scan chain1 captured response pattern
(b′4 − b′0) and the observed pattern at scan out1 (b4 − b0) can
be formulated as
b4 = b
′
4 (6)
b3 = b
′
3k3 + d
′
3k3 (7)
b2 = b
′
2(k2 ⊕ k3) + d′2(k2 ⊕ k3) (8)
b1 = b
′
1(k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3) + d′1(k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3) (9)
b0 = b
′
0(k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3) + d′0(k0 ⊕ k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ k3) (10)
Similarly, for scan chain2 (d4 − d0) can be represented in
terms of (d′4 − d′0) Similarly, for scan chain2 (c′4 − c′0) can
be represented in terms of (c4 − c0) by replacing b and d
with d and a respectively in the equations (6) - (10). There
are ten equations to find out four variables and hence, the
equations can be resolved and the values of k0, k1, k2 and k3
can be ascertained. As mentioned in [8], while the overall
circuit produced by SAT is guaranteed to be functionally
equivalent to the obfuscated circuit, there is no guarantee
it will match the obfuscated circuit on a gate-by-gate basis.
Hence, the scan connections that are obtained from scanSAT
cannot be guaranteed to be correct on per connection basis.
Considering the circuit as shown in Figure 2, unless we find
values of k0, k1, k2 and k3 combinations as listed in Table I,
we cannot ascertain the connections between scan ports and
combinational logic ports. Hence, ScanSAT may not exactly
provide the clarity of the connections required.
When the number of scan camouflaging connections are
significantly larger as in case of scan compression, the number
of equations that can be formulated would be very less
compared to the variables to be solved. For example, for a
compression ratio of 2 for the same circuit, we can have
a maximum of five equations for four scan camouflaging
flipflop connections. For a compression ratio of 4 for the
same circuit, we can have a maximum of five equations for
eight scan camouflaging flipflop connections, which cannot be
resolved. Number of equations are dependent on the number
of flipflops in the scan chain where as the number of scan
camouflaging connections depend on the number of flipflops.
As the compression ratio increases, the problem becomes more
complex and cannot be resolved using scanSAT.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
Logical synthesis is carried out with the Synopsys Design
Compiler using GF 40lp standard cell libraries. Scan stitching
is done on the synthesized netlist using DFT compiler to
have 10 scan chains for each design. Floorplan and placement
steps are carried out in Cadence Encounter. The flipflops that
have to be camouflaged are replaced with the flipflops having
DSI port. The DSI of these flops is connected to Q port of
the nearby flipflops. Clock Tree Synthesis and Routing are
done on this netlist in Encounter tool. On the routed netlist,
Static Timing Analysis is carried out using PrimeTime and
Power Analysis is done using PT-PX. The proposed idea with
50% obfuscation is implemented on six IWLS-2005 circuits
in total and implementation results are shown in Table II. It is
observed that there is 13% to 25% increase in net length, an
impact of 0.7% to 2.2% on frequency and 0.05% to 0.38%
on power consumption compared with the original circuit
implementation. As there is no change in the logical netlist,
TABLE II
BENCHMARK CIRCUIT ANALYSIS WITH THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
Original Statistics (Without Obfuscation) Proposed Methodology (50% Obfuscation) Difference
Circuit No.of Frequency Total power Net length Frequency Total power Net length ∆F ∆P ∆L
Flops F(MHz) P(mW) L(µm) F(MHz) P(mW) L(µm) (%) (%) (%)
usb phy 98 473 0.34 4331 464 0.34 5041 1.9 0.23 16.4
sasc 116 458 0.40 5449 448 0.40 6351 2.2 0.05 16.6
des 190 188 0.64 19948 184 0.64 22667 2.2 0.34 13.6
spi 229 188 0.24 20429 183 0.24 24223 2.2 0.38 18.6
s38584 1380 193 2.16 204335 190 2.17 256476 1.7 0.37 25.5
wb conmax 818 147 0.84 400104 146 0.85 452279 0.7 0.37 13.0
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH EXISTING TECHNIQUES
Metrics Scrambling Encrypt Proposed
[10] Flipflop [11] Methodology
Type of Obfuscation Obfuscation Obfuscation
countermeasure based based based
Layout level Can withstand
reverse engineering Vulnerable Not Vulnerable because of
dummy contacts
Reset-and-scan Not Vulnerable [11] Not
attack Vulnerable Vulnerable
there would be no impact on pattern generation time and
test time.There would be slight increase in the area with the
addition of dummy port if the requirement of having same
electrical and timing characteristics has to be met. We could
not quantify the area increase because of the unavailability of
such a flipflop from the foundry. But it is expected to be very
small and depends on the % obfuscation. The performance
metrics of the proposed methodology are compared with the
state of the art countermeasures for scan based attacks like
Encrypt flipflop [11] and Scrambling [10] as shown in Table
III. The state of the art obfuscation based countermeasures
are vulnerable to layout based reverse engineering attacks or
Reset-and-scan attack where as the proposed methodology
can withstand all such attacks. Hence, using the proposed
methodology, the design can be made secure even in the
presence of layout based reverse engineering attack, Reset-
and-scan attack and scanSAT attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
We introduced scan camouflaging flipflop methodology to
resist scan based attacks that are mainly employed to decode
camouflaged combinational logic using Incremental SAT algo-
rithms. The dummy port (DSI) which is added using dummy
contacts inside the flipflop creates confusion on which is the
real scan input port. This technique has an advantage over
the state of the art techniques like Encrypt flipflop [11] and
Scrambling [10] as it is not effected by reset-and-scan attack
or layout based reverse engineering attacks. We validated the
proposed methodology with IWLS-2005 benchmark circuits.
From experimental results, it is concluded that the proposed
technique has no impact on power and scan test time. There is
a maximum of 2.2% impact on delay with 50% obfuscation.
Furthermore, we also analysed the robustness of the proposed
method when subjected to ScanSAT attack with and without
scan compression. Our proposed methodology can secure
the design from Incremental SAT-based attack and ScanSAT
attack.
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